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INTRODUCTION
The approval of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In1
ternational Property Rights (TRIPs) by the United States in 1994 ne-
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 28, Apr.
15, 1994, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs] (expanding the patent grant
to include an exclusive right to offer the invention for sale).
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cessitated substantial changes to the U.S. patent laws. In particular, a
patentee’s grant was expanded to encompass the right to exclude oth3
ers from offering the patented invention for sale. Accordingly, 35
U.S.C. § 271(a), the default provision of the patent infringement statute, was modified to read, in pertinent part, that “whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention
within the United States . . . during the term of the patent therefor,
4
infringes the patent.”
Since the addition of “offer to sell” infringement, many cases implicating this statutory provision have been filed in federal district
5
court, and a few have reached the Court of Appeals for the Federal
6
Circuit (hereinafter Federal Circuit or CAFC). However, no such
2

See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter URAA] (“An Act to
approve and implement the trade agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations.”). The URAA modified sections of the United States
Code too numerous to list comprehensively, including provisions of Titles 7 (agriculture), 15 (commerce and trade), 17 (copyrights), 19 (customs duties), 26 (internal
revenue code), 28 (judiciary and judicial procedure), and 35 (patents). Among the
many sections of Title 35 amended to bring U.S. patent law into conformity with the
requirements of TRIPs, sections 154 (contents and term of patent; provisional rights)
and 271 (infringement of patent) are most pertinent to the discussion herein. See
URAA, supra, § 533, 108 Stat. at 4988. The changes enacted under the URAA became
effective on January 1, 1996, one year after the WTO Agreement entered into force
with respect to the United States. Id. § 534, 108 Stat. at 4990. The WTO Agreement
entered into force with respect to the United States on January 1, 1995. Proclamation
6780, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,845 (Mar. 27, 1995).
3
Previously, a patentee only had the right to exclude others from making, using,
and selling the invention in the United States, and importing the invention into the
United States. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1994).
4
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (emphasis added). Section 271(c) was amended to
include “offers to sell” a “component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process [if] especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,” and § 271(g) was amended to include “offers to sell” a “product which is made
by” a patented process.
5
See infra notes 8-9 (listing cases involving “offer to sell” infringement).
6
See, e.g., Fieldturf Int’l, Inc. v. Sprinturf, Inc., 433 F.3d 1366, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (holding that a bid to supply a patented product specified in a Request for Proposal (RFP) is not an infringing “offer to sell” when state law interprets such an RFP to
include an “or equal” clause and it is understood that the bidder will be supplying a
noninfringing substitute); MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon
Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (determining that email communications
describing an allegedly infringing device, but without including price terms, did not
constitute an “offer to sell”); Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246,
1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (analogizing “offer to sell” under § 271(a) to the “on sale”
bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and defining “offer to sell” liability “according to the norms
of traditional contractual analysis”); HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1309
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that a “mere offer to donate, where a donation is never
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case has yet substantively adjudicated, based on a fully developed record, whether the article or method purportedly offered for sale in
7
fact infringed valid claims of an issued U.S. patent. Rather, each such
reported or unreported case alleging “offer to sell” infringement has
received only a preliminary disposition. Most often, these cases have
considered either a summary judgment motion based on whether
8
there was an “offer to sell” within the meaning of § 271(a) or a momade, cannot be an offer for sale”); 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a letter conveying “a description of the allegedly
infringing merchandise and the price at which it can be purchased” is an “offer to
sell”).
7
Were an “offer to sell” case to reach trial on all the substantive issues, a claim
construction would be required, likely by way of a “Markman” hearing (named after
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)), with regard to an article
that may not yet have been actually made. See William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still
Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55, 56-67 (1999), and Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in
the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance From the Federal Circuit, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 728-37 (2003), for background on “Markman” hearings.
Additionally, because “offer to sell” cases begin further removed from the ultimate
question of infringement of specific patent claims than cases concerning actual making, selling, or use, “offer to sell” cases are less likely to reach a substantive infringement determination. Therefore, perhaps a claim of “offer to sell” infringement is best
viewed as a procedural tool for obtaining settlement or for pressuring an alleged prospective infringer to license the invention or to cease and desist from practicing it,
rather than as a cause of action for which equitable relief would normally be awarded.
8
See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 01 C 8452, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2329,
at *21 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2003) (surmising, based on Rotec and HollyAnne, that for an
advertisement to constitute an “offer to sell,” it must at least include detailed product
information and pricing, but denying defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on other grounds); Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 174 F. Supp.
2d 388, 393-94, 397 (D. Md. 2001) (denying summary judgment after examining the
“offer to sell” language of § 271(a), (c), and (g), and determining that contracting to
buy a product made using a patented process, even if the product is not made during
the time period in question, is sufficient for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction
under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)); Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., Ltd., 130 F.
Supp. 2d 1152, 1171, 1777 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (granting the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on issues of direct and indirect infringement and holding that
infringement cannot “be found solely premised on an ‘offer to sell’ within the United
States, unless the sale that is contemplated by the ‘offer’ is or will also be consummated
within the United States”); Halmar Robicon Group Inc. v. Toshiba Int’l Corp., No. 98501, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19869, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1999) (denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, despite holding as a matter of law that an “offer to
sell” occurred within the United States, because a claim construction was required to
determine infringement); Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp., 75 F.
Supp. 2d 613, 621-25 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (denying a preliminary injunction and dismissing the case on summary judgment, holding that making an offer in the United States
to make or sell a product outside of the United States was not within the statutory
meaning of § 271(a)); Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Corp., No. 96-C-0087-C, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21325, at *12-17 (W.D. Wis. July 15, 1997) (holding that an offer to sell a patented article occurring before issuance of the patent did not infringe because the con-
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tion to dismiss for lack of specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on the purported “offer to sell” activities and con9
tacts.
The substantive evaluations of personal jurisdiction and infringement based on “offers to sell” are not necessarily completely independent. In some of the personal jurisdiction cases, the courts have
conflated the issues and conducted an “offer to sell” analysis—at least
based upon the pleaded facts when viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party (i.e., the plaintiff)—to reach a conclusion regarding
10
specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. On the surface, it
seems almost inevitable that these issues will be conflated, since the
prevailing specific personal jurisdiction test used by the Federal Cir11
cuit in patent cases requires a nexus between the cause of action and
the activities in the forum, which here are bound to be the same activities. If the in-forum activities suffice to support an alleged “offer to
sell” for purposes of the patent infringement statute, the requisite
contacts likely exist to justify the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the offering party. Conversely, if the in-forum activities cannot support an alleged “offer for sale,” the exercise of personal jurisdiction will likely be found improper.

tract at issue had “a provision . . . to work around any infringement problems that
might arise” and the defendant did nothing more than design around the patent once
it issued, and granting defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue
of infringement).
9
See infra Part III.A for a discussion of some cases in this category, including:
Wafios Mach. Corp. v. Nucoil Indus. Co., No. 03 Civ. 9865 (RWS), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13674 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2004); Moldflow Corp. v. Simcon, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d
34 (D. Mass. 2003); Sitrick v. Freehand Sys., Inc., No. 02 C 1568, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21140 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2002); Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Dawson Int’l Inc., 216 F.
Supp. 2d 754 (N.D. Ind. 2002); Recycling Scis. Int’l, Inc. v. Soil Restoration & Recycling, L.L.C., No. 00 C 0311, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12989 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2001);
USA Payments, Inc. v. Hotel Ramada of Nev., No. C-01-1450 VRW, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9493 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2001); Biometics, L.L.C. v. New Womyn, Inc., 112 F.
Supp. 2d 869 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
10
For cases justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction based, in part, on an
“offer to sell” analysis, see Sitrick, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21140, at *9-15; Int’l Truck, 216
F. Supp. 2d at 759-62; Biometics, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 871-74. For cases declining to exercise personal jurisdiction, determining that an “offer to sell” was lacking, see Moldflow,
296 F. Supp. 2d at 42-44; USA Payments, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9493, at *6-9.
11
For a discussion of Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1995), which provided the prevailing test for personal jurisdiction used by the Federal Circuit in patent
cases, see infra Part I.A.
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However, the apparent symmetry of this reasoning is illusory.
The conflation, as manifest in the cases, results because the “offer to
sell” query serves two purposes. It is an essential element for proving
alleged infringement under the “offer to sell” provisions of the patent
13
statutes. It is also the key—assuming no other contacts between the
defendant and the forum state—to evaluating whether the exercise of
14
specific personal jurisdiction can be justified under due process.
The dual doctrinal function of the purported “offer to sell” enables two defensive approaches to “offer to sell” infringement litiga15
tion, the substantive avenue and the procedural avenue. Notwithstanding that both avenues ultimately may require addressing whether
there was an “offer to sell,” the disparate purposes served by the “offer
to sell” determination within each context suggest that there is, or at
12

As discussed infra Part III.C, this Comment advocates two improvements in the
adjudication of “offer to sell” cases that could occur either separately or in parallel.
The first suggestion is to broaden the interpretation of “offer to sell” in the personal
jurisdiction inquiry. The second suggestion is to expand the scope of activities covered
by “offer to sell” in the substantive infringement evaluation. The asymmetry between
these two suggestions arises because broadening the personal jurisdiction test without
expanding the substantive infringement test will give more patentees the opportunity
to adjudicate their claims, but expanding the substantive infringement test without
broadening the personal jurisdiction test will have no effect on the ability of patentees
to vindicate their rights.
13
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”); id. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States . . . a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, [with certain qualifications,] shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”); id. § 271(e)(1) (exempting otherwise infringing activities, including offers to sell, if done “solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products”); id. § 271(g) (“Whoever without authority . . . offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is
made by a [patented] process . . . shall be liable as an infringer, if the . . . offer to sell,
sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent.”).
14
See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the second prong of the
Akro personal jurisdiction test).
15
The substantive argument, as utilized in Rotec Industries v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215
F.3d 1246, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2000), MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials
Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1374-77 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and Fieldturf International, Inc. v.
Sprinturf, Inc., 433 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006), is that the alleged activities did not
constitute an “offer to sell” the patented article within the United States. See infra Part
II.C (discussing the Federal Circuit’s consideration of “offer to sell” cases on their merits). The procedural argument, as utilized in 3D Systems, Inc. v. Aarotech Laboratories,
Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998) and HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d
1304, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1999), is that the alleged activities within the forum were insufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See infra Part I.B (discussing the
Federal Circuit’s consideration of “offer to sell” cases on the issue of personal jurisdiction).
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least should be, a distinctly different meaning of “offer to sell” within
each context. As a result, there should be considerable differences as
to how these two avenues are analyzed by courts.
This Comment argues that there is a difference of meaning between an “offer to sell” for purposes of satisfying the patent infringement statute and an “offer to sell” giving rise to sufficient contacts
within a forum to authorize specific personal jurisdiction. The dissimilarity of purpose served by the two applications necessitates that
there be a difference. Additionally, this Comment discusses why these
two tests should not be equated as a matter of doctrinal coherence;
why courts have generally been unable to make the required distinction; and how patent infringement enforcement would be enhanced
by judging each application of the “offer to sell” analysis under differ16
ent criteria.
This Comment provides a detailed analysis of the determination
of “offer to sell” in both statutory patent infringement and personal
jurisdictional circumstances. Part I explores the Federal Circuit test
for personal jurisdiction in patent matters and then posits that in the
application of its test for “offer to sell” infringement actions, the CAFC
has reached beyond the jurisdictional question to make substantive
pronouncements as to the meaning of the “offer to sell” language in
the patent infringement statute. Part II discusses the interpretation of
“offer to sell” within the purview of the patent infringement statute
16

Since the enactment of TRIPs, many commentators have analyzed the meaning
of the statutory “offer to sell” language in § 271(a), but no commentator has done so
in the context of determining specific personal jurisdiction in patent infringement
cases. See, e.g., Edwin D. Garlepp, An Analysis of the Patentee’s New Exclusive Right to “Offer
to Sell,” 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 315, 329 (1999) (predicting that the new
statutory grant will be interpreted as a separate and distinct right serving the underlying policies of patent protection); Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a
Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering To Sell an Invention and Implications for the
On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751,
820-21 (2003) [hereinafter Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”] (arguing for a
strong “offer to sell” patent infringement doctrine not bounded by the requirement of
a formal offer or actual reduction to practice of the alleged infringing article); Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in the United States
to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 748-58 (2004) [hereinafter Holbrook, Territoriality Waning] (advocating a flexible but complex approach to allowing
U.S. courts to consider the laws of the foreign jurisdiction in which a contemplated
sale would be made when determining if offers made in the United States constitute
infringement); Robert Ryan Morishita, Patent Infringement After GATT: What Is an Offer
To Sell?, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 905, 916-30 (analyzing the meaning of an “offer to sell” in
the context of the constitutional protections of free speech); David Sulkis, Note, Patent
Infringement by Offer To Sell: Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corporation, 38 HOUS.
L. REV. 1099, 1127-28 (2001) (arguing that “offers to sell” should be treated on par
with the traditional forms of infringement of “makes, uses, or sells”).
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and finds that analogies to the “offer” in contract law and the “on sale”
bar to patenting are both inadequate to serve the economic purpose
of “offer to sell” infringement liability. Part III argues that the disparate purposes served by the two “offer to sell” analyses necessitate that
they be treated as doctrinally distinct, illustrates how various federal
district courts have gone astray due to lack of clear guidance from the
Federal Circuit as to the differences and the import of those differences, and concludes that the meaning of “offer to sell” must be interpreted specifically within its discrete and particular personal jurisdictional and substantive contexts if the “offer to sell” patent infringement statute is to evolve meaningfully as a distinct and viable
cause of action.
I. EVALUATING SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN
“OFFER TO SELL” PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
A fundamental reason for the establishment of the Court of Ap17
peals for the Federal Circuit was to promote national uniformity in
18
the adjudication of patent matters.
Therefore, when evaluating
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an alleged patent
infringer is proper, the Federal Circuit applies its own law “rather than
19
that of the regional circuit in which the case arose.” This standard
applies equally whether the defendant is an alleged infringer or a pat20
entee in a declaratory action.
17

Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (bringing into existence the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on Oct. 1, 1982 by
merging the appellate division of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals).
18
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981) (“[T]he central purpose [of the Federal
Courts Improvement Act] is to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the administration of patent law.”); S. REP. NO.
97-275, at 5 (1981) (contemplating that “[t]he creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity” and “will increase doctrinal stability
in the field of patent law”).
19
Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the district courts follow the CAFC’s approach. See infra note 196 and accompanying text
(discussing the district courts’ obligation to follow Federal Circuit precedent in patent
cases).
20
Regardless which party challenges the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the issue
is “intimately involved with the substance of the patent laws.” Akro, 45 F.3d at 1543.
Different personal jurisdiction issues will be invoked in a declaratory action, since the
contacts determination will normally be based on cease and desist letters sent by the
patentee to the alleged infringer, or on the initiation of licensing negotiations between
the patentee and the alleged infringer. See, e.g., Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc.,
326 F.3d 1194, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (deciding under Akro’s third prong (reasonableness) that “the sending of letters threatening infringement litigation is not sufficient to
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A. The Federal Circuit Test for Personal Jurisdiction in Patent Cases
Each circuit court is free to develop its own test for the exercise of
21
personal jurisdiction, framed by relevant Supreme Court precedents,
22
and prior to the creation of the CAFC, these various regional circuit
23
tests were applied in patent litigation.
The Federal Circuit recognized early in its existence its “mandate to achieve uniformity in pat24
ent matters” as “the spirit and guiding principle of th[e] court.”
However, more than a decade passed until the Federal Circuit had
the opportunity to assess the need for a uniform personal jurisdiction
standard regarding matters within its exclusive grant of appellate sub25
ject matter jurisdiction. The analytical framework of Beverly Hills Fan
confer personal jurisdiction”); Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., 279 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (holding that contacts “for the purpose of warning against infringement or
negotiating license agreements” are not sufficient to support a fair and reasonable
exercise of personal jurisdiction); Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc.,
148 F.3d 1355, 1359-62 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (declining to exercise personal jurisdiction
where the patentee sent a cease and desist letter that included an entreaty to license to
an alleged infringer); Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455,
1458-60 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding personal jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action for invalidity and noninfringement where the patentee sent letters to an alleged
infringer threatening suit and entered into a licensing agreement with a distributor
through which the patentee’s products were sold in the state).
21
For an extensive review of the current state of personal jurisdiction in the federal courts, see 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1063-1068.1 (3d ed. 2004).
22
See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment of the
CAFC by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982).
23
See, e.g., Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th
Cir. 1991) (considering only “whether the exercise of [personal] jurisdiction is proper
under the forum state’s long-arm statute” and whether it “comports with due process”);
Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 293, 294 (3d Cir. 1985) (considering it
both fair and reasonable under the Fifth Amendment “[t]o aggregate the national
contacts of an alien defendant in order to obtain personal jurisdiction,” in the case
where the forum state’s long-arm “statute expressly incorporates the federal due process standard”); Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1982) (refusing
to construe a due process limitation on the exercise of personal jurisdiction from federal statutory venue restrictions for patent cases); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v.
Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing at
length why federal courts, in cases where Congress has made no provision for services
of process, “refer to local statutes or rules governing competence”); Honeywell, Inc. v.
Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding it appropriate to
“appl[y] the ‘minimum contacts’ standard to federal question cases in which [personal] jurisdiction [i]s at issue”).
24
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
25
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). In
particular, § 1295(a)(1) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over appeals of federal district court final decisions arising out of certain cases in which origi-
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26

Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp. set the stage for the Federal Circuit to
enunciate, within a year, its test for personal jurisdiction that has been
27
followed since.
As a preliminary matter, the CAFC in Akro recognized that
“[b]ecause subject matter jurisdiction [in a patent infringement] action exists by virtue of a federal question,” a Fifth Amendment due
28
process analysis was appropriate. However, finding that the Supreme
Court had never reached the due process issue in a federal question
29
case, the Akro court fashioned a test based on the Fourteenth
Amendment due process jurisprudence emanating from International
30
Shoe and its progeny. Nevertheless, the potential difference of interpretation between Fifth Amendment due process and Fourteenth
31
Amendment due process could be critical in a patent case involving
an alien defendant. While there is always a forum within the United
States where a party domiciled in another state is amenable to suit, the
32
same is not true for a party domiciled in a foreign country.
nal jurisdiction “was based, in whole or in part, on” 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (pertaining to
patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, and trademarks).
26
21 F.3d 1558, 1565-72 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting the lack of uniformity among the
circuit courts with regard to the test for personal jurisdiction and declaring that the
application of a uniform Federal Circuit standard to matters unique to patent law
would “promote our mandate of achieving national uniformity in the field of patent
law.”).
27
See Akro, 45 F.3d at 1545-46. North American Philips Corp. v. American Vending
Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994), decided after Beverly Hills Fan but before Akro, also addressed the issue of personal jurisdiction in a patent infringement
suit, albeit less comprehensively.
28
Akro, 45 F.3d at 1544. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 conveys subject matter jurisdiction to the
federal courts for federal question cases, including civil actions arising under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (the federal patent infringement statute). Moreover, the federal district courts
have exclusive “original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
29
Akro, 45 F.3d at 1545 n.4.
30
Id. at 1544-49 (relying on International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945), for the proposition that “due process requires only that . . . [the defendant]
have certain minimum contacts” with the forum).
31
The Supreme Court has not decided whether there is any difference with regard
to the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (declining to find “an occasion . . . to determine whether
Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the
State in which the federal court sits”).
32
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LIGITATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 93
(3d ed. 1996) (“Assertions of jurisdiction over foreign defendants often raise different
issues than assertions of jurisdiction over U.S. defendants from other states of the Union.”). Personal jurisdiction can always be asserted in the state of domicile of a non-
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The Akro due process test involves three successive determinations:
whether the activities or contacts in the forum were purposefully di33
rected, whether the cause of action “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to
34
those activities,” and whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
35
would be constitutionally reasonable. The first prong of Akro captures the traditional minimum contacts analysis, and the third prong
bounds personal jurisdiction within the constitutional guarantee of
due process. With regard to the analysis of “offer to sell” infringement, this Comment has no quarrel with the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of those prongs.
The second prong of the Akro test is “the divining rod that separates specific jurisdiction cases from general jurisdiction cases . . .
[and] ensures that the element of causation remains in the forefront
36
of the due process investigation.” Critically, the Akro court endorsed
the view that the disjunctive nature of the “constitutional catch37
phrase” requiring that a cause of action “arise out of or relate to”
contacts within the forum portends “added flexibility and signal[s] a
38
relaxation of the applicable standard.” The CAFC, along with the
other circuit courts, has been left to its own determination of the reqalien defendant. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940); accord RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 47(1)(b) (1934) (“A state has jurisdiction over a person . . . if he is domiciled in the state although not present there . . . .”). The Akro
court, dealing with a defendant of American domicile, was spared the issue of an alien
defendant. 45 F.3d at 1542. Although one of the codefendants in Beverly Hills Fan was
an alien, the court in that case applied its analysis as if the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process issues were identical. 21 F.3d at 1560, 1565-69.
33
Akro, 45 F.3d at 1546; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (requiring “that there be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State” before a state can invoke personal jurisdiction).
34
Akro, 45 F.3d at 1545 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (holding that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction meets the fundamental requirements of due process “[w]hen a controversy
is related to or ‘arises out of’ a defendant’s contact with the forum”).
35
Akro, 45 F.3d at 1545.
36
Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 207 (1st Cir. 1994). The
second prong of Akro arguably attempts to focus the personal jurisdiction test on “the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” but is overly constraining. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977); see also infra Part III (distinguishing questions of personal jurisdiction from questions of substantive patent infringement). For the seminal analysis in which the terms “specific jurisdiction” and
“general jurisdiction” were first coined, see Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
37
Ticketmaster-New York, 26 F.3d at 206.
38
Akro, 45 F.3d at 1547 (quoting Ticketmaster-New York, 26 F.3d at 206) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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uisite “nexus between the defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s
39
cause of action” since the Supreme Court declined to address the
“distinction between controversies that ‘relate to’ a defendant’s con40
tacts with a forum and those that ‘arise out of’ such contacts.” Because it has recognized that there are “few guideposts” on this aspect
41
of the personal jurisdiction inquiry, the CAFC must be willing to
draw from a broader range of due process jurisprudence in shaping
42
the meaning of the second prong.
In defending against a motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff bears the
burden to establish the court’s [personal] jurisdiction [over the de43
fendant], which normally is not a heavy one.” Most commonly, the
plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing when the court bases
its decision solely on the parties’ pleadings and affidavits, but otherwise “bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant exists by a preponderance of the
44
evidence.”
Additionally, “all factual disputes must be resolved in
[the plaintiff’s] favor in order to evaluate its prima facie showing of
45
jurisdiction.” Further, “the Supreme Court has intimated that in the
case of a challenge to the constitutional fairness and reasonableness of
46
the chosen forum, the burden is on the defendant.”

39

Ticketmaster-New York, 26 F.3d at 206.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10.
41
Akro, 45 F.3d at 1547.
42
In addition to the cases cited in Part II.A, there are a number of other applicable cases addressing the necessary relationship between the cause of action and the inforum contacts of the defendant. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984)
(embracing the “effects” test for conduct occurring outside of the forum but causing
harm within the forum); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984)
(holding that due process was satisfied when the defendant “continuously and deliberately exploited” the forum market); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that mere foreseeability is insufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction but rather that due process critically requires “that the
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”).
43
5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1351; accord 35B C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 832 (2003) (“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has
jurisdiction over the defendant.”).
44
5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1351; accord 35B C.J.S., supra note , § 832
(“[T]he plaintiff need only make a showing of personal jurisdiction, with prima facie
evidence being sufficient.”).
45
Deprenyl Animal Health, Inc. v. Univ. of Toronto Innovations Found., 297 F.3d
1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
46
5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1351.
40
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B. The Federal Circuit’s Application of the Akro Test to
“Offer To Sell” Patent Infringement Cases
The CAFC has twice adjudicated the issue of personal jurisdiction
in the context of “offer to sell” infringement actions. Both times it has
unnecessarily reached a substantive analysis of whether an “offer to
sell” existed under the patent infringement statute by stretching be47
yond the nexus requirement set forth in the second prong of Akro.
The resulting dicta has created confusion since it apparently conflicts
with Rotec’s later holding that “offer to sell” should be interpreted to
48
require an “offer” as used in contract parlance. Viewed in this light,
both the doctrinal and policy purposes of distinguishing between the
49
statutory and personal jurisdictional meanings of “offer to sell” illuminate the failure of the Federal Circuit to fully appreciate the import
of procedural posture on the viability of this fledgling form of patent
50
infringement.
The Federal Circuit first grappled with a motion to dismiss for lack
51
of personal jurisdiction in the context of an “offer to sell” infringe52
ment action in 3D Systems, Inc. v. Aarotech Laboratories, Inc. 3D Sys53
tems, a leading manufacturer of rapid prototyping equipment, filed
suit in the Central District of California, alleging infringement of its
patents, as well as trade libel and unfair competition, by its competitor

47

See supra note 34 and accompanying text .
See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“[W]e . . . define § 271(a)’s ‘offer to sell’ liability according to the norms of
traditional contractual analysis.”); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.3, at 112-13
(3d ed. 1999) (defining an offer “as a manifestation to another of assent to enter into a
contract if the other manifests assent in return”).
49
See infra Part II.C (discussing the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “offer to
sell”).
50
By adopting an unnecessarily stringent analysis for personal jurisdiction for
“offer to sell” patent infringement cases, the Federal Circuit has (perhaps unwittingly)
greatly decreased the ability of patentees to litigate these cases on the merits, thereby
eliminating many opportunities for the district courts to develop a coherent body of
law in this area and impairing the effectiveness of the policy embodied in the “offer to
sell” statutory provision. See infra Part II.A (discussing the additional statutory rights
intended to be protected by the “offer to sell” provision); infra Part III.B (arguing that
the Federal Circuit’s application of the second prong of Akro has been overly rigid,
thereby distorting due process at plaintiffs’ expense).
51
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
52
160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
53
Rapid prototyping equipment “is used to produce three-dimensional prototype
models of products during the design and development phase of [those] products.”
3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1376.
48
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54

Aarotech. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdic55
tion over all three defendants.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed with respect to defendant
56
Aaroflex, applying the Akro test and breathed life into the previously
57
untested “offer to sell” provision in § 271(a). The alleged infringing
activities of Aaroflex comprised mailing “eight letters containing price
quotations and descriptions of the merchandise for sale,” as well as
solicitation letters and other “promotional materials,” to prospective
58
customers in the forum state.
The court concluded that the solicitations, promotional letters,
and price quotations satisfied the first prong of the Akro test, as these
59
pre-sales activities were “clearly purposefully directed at” the forum.
Similarly, the court found that the claim against Aaroflex arose out of
those purposefully directed activities, thus satisfying the second Akro
60
prong.
Determined to make the prohibition against offers to sell
more than just hollow verbiage, the court opined that the “offer to
sell” statutory language was intended “to prevent exactly the type of
activity Aaroflex ha[d] engaged in, namely, generating interest in a
potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of the right61
ful patentee.”
In so doing, the court, perhaps anxious to shape the meaning of
the new statutory term, overreached by making substantive pronouncements when its appellate jurisdiction was founded only on
62
procedural decisions. Such overreaching is not harmless since these
54

Joined as defendants in the suit were Aarotech Laboratories, Inc., an Oklahoma
corporation based in Virginia; Aaroflex, Inc., a subsidiary of Aarotech Laboratories and
a West Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia; and Albert
C. Young, the president and chairman of the board of Aaroflex. Plaintiff 3D Systems
was a corporation based in California. Id. at 1375-76.
55
Id. at 1375.
56
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
57
See 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1378 (acknowledging that this opportunity to apply the
recently added “offer to sell” language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) was “an issue of first impression”). The relevant personal jurisdiction analysis and holding of the court, for
purposes of evaluating the development of this doctrine in the Federal Circuit, pertain
to Aaroflex. The dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction with respect to Aarotech
Laboratories and Albert C. Young were affirmed by the CAFC. Id. at 1381.
58
Id. at 1376.
59
Id. at 1378; see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
60
3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379; see supra note and accompanying text (identifying the
second prong of the Akro test).
61
3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379.
62
See infra note 87 (noting that neither HollyAnne nor 3D Systems was on appeal
from a final decision on the merits).
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early “offer to sell” infringement cases created guiding, if not binding,
63
precedent for the district courts.
The court could have achieved the same result by simply acknowledging the nexus between the cause of action under the statute and
the purportedly infringing activities, finding either that the former
64
“arises out of” the latter, or that they are “related to” one another;
the plaintiff had met the prima facie burden required on the plead65
ings.
Instead, the court took de facto (although obviously not de
jure) jurisdiction of the case in order to declare, in dictum, principles
guiding the establishment of substantive legal boundaries on “offer to
66
sell” infringement. Compounding this error and ignoring Akro’s discussion of a flexible second prong, the court, without comment, stiffened the second prong test, deeming it to be “whether the cause of
67
action arises out of or directly relates to [the in-forum] activities.”
Finally, the court affirmatively answered the due process reasonableness question of the third Akro prong, rejecting as untenable the
argument of inconvenience in defending a suit in the same forum
68
where it was recently convenient to market one’s products.
In HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., the Federal Circuit again unnecessarily reached a substantive determination of the meaning of “offer to
sell,” examining the facts in detail and determining that a purported
“mere offer to donate, where a donation is never made, cannot be an
offer for sale” and therefore does not fall within the purview of the
69
statutory prohibition. HollyAnne, a manufacturer of patented cable

63

See infra note 196 and accompanying text (citing cases following the precedent
created in 3D Systems and HollyAnne).
64
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315, 320 (1945) (finding sufficient “minimum contacts” in the “mere solicitation of orders for the purchase of goods
within [the] state”); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
295 (1980) (declining jurisdiction because, inter alia, defendants did not “solicit . . .
business . . . through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State”).
65
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (reviewing the procedural burdens
involved in a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).
66
The court decided de novo the substantive issue that was not decided below,
effectively acting as a trial court but with an incomplete record, since the case below
was dismissed on a FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) motion.
67
3D Sys., Inc., v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); see supra notes 34, 38 and accompanying text (defining the test for
Akro’s second prong and noting its potential flexibility).
68
3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1380; see supra note 35 and accompanying text (defining
Akro’s third prong).
69
199 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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70

television encoder devices, sued in the District of Nebraska, accusing
71
TFT of making, using, offering to sell, and selling infringing devices.
However, specific personal jurisdiction in the forum was premised
only on “a newspaper article describing TFT’s offer, at a private meeting with school officials, to donate the allegedly infringing devices to a
school system and a local cable television station,” which HollyAnne
72
characterized as an “offer to sell.” The district court dismissed for
73
lack of personal jurisdiction over TFT.
As in 3D Systems, the CAFC in HollyAnne took de facto jurisdiction
over the case, confusing the absence of a cause of action with the lack
of personal jurisdiction. Instead of restricting itself to an appropriately narrow holding, the CAFC propounded, in dictum, that an offer
to make a donation “include[s] none of the hallmarks of a potential
74
commercial transaction” and is not the “legal equivalent of an ‘offer
75
to sell’ for purposes of patent infringement” under § 271(a). This
language may have been warranted in a dismissal for “failure of the
76
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” or in a
grant of summary judgment where no material facts were in genuine
dispute and the alleged infringer was entitled to prevail as a matter of
77
law, but was superfluous in assessing the existence of a requisite
nexus between the cause of action and the alleged in-forum activities.
By not confining its analysis to the procedural posture of the case,
the HollyAnne court based its dismissal on a failure to meet the nexus
requirement of the second prong of Akro, not because the cause of
action did not “arise out of” the defendant’s activities in the forum
78
state but because there was in fact no cause of action. Additionally,
70

HollyAnne held two patents on these devices: U.S. Patent No. 4,575,750 (filed
May 31, 1984) (issued Mar. 11, 1986) and U.S. Patent No. 5,548,323 (filed Mar. 30,
1994) (issued Aug. 20, 1996). HollyAnne, 199 F.3d at 1305.
71
Id. HollyAnne was a Nebraska corporation and TFT was a California corporation.
72
Id. at 1308.
73
Id. at 1305. The district court also transferred venue to the Northern District of
California, a transfer reversed as improper by the CAFC. Id. at 1305, 1310.
74
Id. at 1310.
75
Id. at 1308.
76
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
77
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1476 (8th ed. 2004) (defining summary judgment as “[a] judgment granted on a claim about which there is no
genuine issue of material fact and upon which the movant is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law”).
78
See HollyAnne, 199 F.3d at 1310 (holding that because the offer to donate was
not an “offer to sell,” the action could not give rise to a cause of action under § 271);
see also supra note 34 and accompanying text (defining Akro’s second prong).
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the court sustained the unexplained stiffening (which originated in
3D Systems) of the relatedness branch of the nexus test by repeating
the requirement that the cause of action be directly related to the de79
fendant’s in-forum contacts.
Since the HollyAnne court accepted—or at least declined to find to
the contrary—that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support a
80
colorable claim arising out of § 271(a), patent infringement jurisprudence would have been better served by the exercise of personal
jurisdiction and a remand for adjudication (likely summary judgment
for the defendants, absent additional evidence of an actual offer to
81
sell) on the merits. Instead, adhering to the prima facie standard,
the court intimated that the purposefully directed activities require82
83
ment of the first Akro prong was not satisfied but declined to base
its dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction on that failing, apparently
84
because that point was uncontested by the defendants. Nonetheless,
such a dismissal would have been preferable to muddling the fledgling
“offer to sell” infringement doctrine with an extraneous substantive
pronouncement.
That the Federal Circuit overreached in both 3D Systems and HollyAnne is further evidenced by what the court failed to consider in
those two decisions. The act of infringement under § 271(a) nominally requires two substantive elements: that infringing conduct (i.e.,
make, use, offer to sell, or sell) have taken place and that the article or
method that is the subject of such conduct be claimed as a patented

79

HollyAnne, 199 F.3d at 1308; see supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the “stiffened” test to be “whether the cause of action arises out of or directly relates to [the in-forum] activities”). The impact of stiffening the “related to” branch of
the nexus requirement is unclear from subsequent cases and may be inconsequential if
the relevant portions of the 3D Systems and HollyAnne opinions reaching this issue are
determined by later courts to be dicta, as is advocated herein.
80
Id. at 1309 (noting that the plaintiff submitted an affidavit alleging that the defendant “distributed products in Nebraska that allegedly infringe”).
81
See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1351 (describing the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence).
82
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
83
See HollyAnne, 199 F.3d at 1308 (noting that “HollyAnne does not cite any efforts
by TFT to quote prices, solicit orders or send promotional sales letters to [forum] residents” and that HollyAnne had conceded at oral argument “that the only specific evidence it had of any [in-forum] activity . . . was a newspaper article describing . . . a private meeting with school officials” at which TFT made the alleged offer).
84
See id. (declining to base its holding on the first Akro prong, apparently because
the alleged infringer “[did] not challenge the assertion that the [alleged ‘offer to sell’]
satisfie[d] the ‘directing activities to residents of the forum’ prong of the test”).
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85

invention whose patent is still in force. Each element is equally indispensable, and both must be found to support a finding of infringement. Yet, while both opinions devote extensive consideration
to the question of infringing conduct, neither even mentions whether
86
the article or method is claimed by the plaintiff’s patent.
If the CAFC understood that it would need to take jurisdiction of
the case to decide the latter issue, why did it not realize the same with
87
regard to the former issue? This disparity of logic is more strongly
apparent in 3D Systems than it is in HollyAnne. In holding the defendant’s in-forum activities insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction,
the HollyAnne court might plausibly claim to have ruled based on the
easier issue, since failure on either would be dispositive, at least within
88
the substantive analytical framework utilized. But in 3D Systems, the
court held that personal jurisdiction was proper based on only one of
the two essential elements in § 271(a), completely ignoring the
89
other.
There are two competing explanations for this failure to examine
whether the article purportedly offered for sale was covered within the
scope of enforceable patent claims: either the court refrained from a
claim construction in order to avoid that often complex and time90
consuming evaluation, or the court erred in reaching the determina85

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
In contrast to the CAFC’s miscue, see Halmar Robicon Group, Inc. v. Toshiba
Int’l Corp., No. 98-501, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19869, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1999)
(recognizing that there is “simply . . . no way in which to examine [plaintiff’s] Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment for patent infringement without first completing a
claim construction on the [patent at issue]”).
87
The CAFC had appellate jurisdiction over both HollyAnne and 3D Systems under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000), which vests the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from district court decisions based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000)
(civil actions relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, mask works, designs, trademarks, and unfair competition). HollyAnne was on appeal from an order
dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue and ordering
a change of venue. 199 F.3d at 1305. 3D Systems was on appeal from an order dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction. 160 F.3d at 1375. However, neither was on appeal
from a final decision on the merits, and therefore the CAFC should not have been able
to exercise its jurisdiction to decide substantive matters at issue in either case that had
never been decided by either respective district court.
88
See HollyAnne, 199 F.3d at 1310 (concluding that the Nebraska district court
correctly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction because of the absence of infringing conduct and not because the article allegedly offered for sale was not the subject of
a valid patent claim).
89
See 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379 (focusing solely on whether there was an “offer to
sell”).
90
Such a determination is often the subject of an entirely separate preliminary
proceeding. See supra note 7 (discussing “Markman” hearings).
86
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tion of whether the in-forum activities constituted an “offer to sell” for
purposes of the infringement statute. The notion that the CAFC
shirked its duties must be disregarded as implausible; if a claim construction was required to decide whether a cause of action arose out of
or was related to the in-forum activities, the court would have been
obligated to undertake it. The conclusion, therefore, is that in a good
faith but premature effort to fulfill its broad mandate of fostering uniform application of the new statutory patent infringement provision in
91
the district courts, the court imprudently set forth the scope of activities falling within the “offer to sell” prohibition.
II. INTERPRETING “OFFER TO SELL” INFRINGEMENT IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE PATENT STATUTES AND CONTRACT LAW
The meaning given to “offer to sell” in § 271(a) is critical in defining the scope of this aspect of the exclusive right granted to a patentee. Relevant context for this definitional task may be found in
both the intended purpose of “offer to sell” infringement protection
and the interpretation of the putatively related concepts of the contractual “offer” and the “on sale” bar to patentability.
A. The Addition of “Offer To Sell” as an Independent
Statutory Grant to the Patentee
A straightforward textual conclusion from § 271(a), post URAA
92
modifications, is that an “offer to sell” a patented article is “sufficient
to constitute patent infringement[, yet t]his new exclusive right is
93
qualified by the addition of § 271(i),” as well as by other language in
§ 271(a) itself. To be an infringing “offer to sell” under the combined
language of § 271(a) and (i), the offer, at a minimum, must be made
94
in the United States and the intended sale must be contemplated to
91

See supra notes 18, 24 and accompanying text (describing the foundation of the
mandate for fostering uniform application).
92
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the URAA modifications).
93
Garlepp, supra note 16, at 315. Section 271(i) provides that “[a]s used in this
section, an ‘offer for sale’ or an ‘offer to sell’ by a person other than the patentee, or
any designee of the patentee, is that in which the sale will occur before the expiration
of the term of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (2000).
94
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent thereof, infringes the patent.”). There is considerable debate as to the modification of “offer to sell” by the
phrase “in the United States” in § 271(a). The most broad and textual, yet simplistic,
reading is advocated by David Sulkis. See Sulkis, supra note 16, at 1103, 1124-28 (arguing that an offer made in the United States is “an infringement of the patentee’s exclu-
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95

occur before the expiration of the patent term. Whether the new
statutory grant of § 271(a) is construed broadly or narrowly with respect to where the intended sale is to be consummated, the “offer to
sell” language effectively extends a patentee’s exclusive rights to prevent infringers from deriving pecuniary benefits from the invention
(and thus potentially diminishing the financial rewards accruing to
96
the patentee) without the patentee’s consent.
Yet undetermined,
however, is the range of activities captured within the scope of the “offer to sell” statutory language so as to constitute infringement.

sionary right, regardless of whether or where the product is ultimately sold, or whether
or where it is delivered”); accord Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 228, 234 (D. Del. 2003) (rejecting the “argument that an ‘offer to sell’ can
only take place if there is also an unlawful [actual or contemplated] sale within the
United States” and instead holding that to so require would “make[] the ‘offer to sell’
language in § 271(a) superfluous”). Others contemplate a far narrower reading. See,
e.g., Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1258-60 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(Newman, J., concurring) (arguing that an offer can be infringing only if the contemplated sale would infringe the patent, and thus that the sale must be contemplated to
occur in the United States). A similar narrow interpretation of the analogous United
Kingdom Statute, discussed infra note 142, was adopted in Kalman v. PCL Packaging
Ltd., [1982] F.S.R. 406, 417-18 (U.K. Patents Ct. 198218 (EWHC (Pat)) (interpreting
the prohibition on “offers to dispose of” to required both the offer and the intended
disposal of the product to occur in the United Kingdom).
95
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(i).
96
See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02, at 16-9 (2004) (noting
that the “offer to sell” language “extends the scope of a patentee’s rights to unauthorized promotional activities that fall short of actual sale, making or use”); Morishita,
supra note 16, at 911-12 (noting that regardless whether “offer to sell” infringement
encompasses offers leading to even foreign, noninfringing sales or only offers contemplating domestic, infringing sales, patent protection will be strengthened); Garlepp,
supra note 16, at 317 (suggesting that congressional intent in conforming with TRIPs
was to “recogniz[e] the offering to sell as an exclusive right separate and distinct from
the right to sell”); 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (acknowledging that “[t]he amendment to § 271(a) represents a distinct change
to the bases for patent infringement”).
The extension of patentee rights is agreed upon even by those who posit the very
restrictive interpretation that no new cause of action has been created. See Thomas L.
Irving & Stacy D. Lewis, Proving a Date of Invention and Infringement After GATT/TRIPS,
22 AIPLA Q.J. 309, 352 (1994) (arguing that the primary result of the “offer to sell”
language is to make “the date of infringement . . . reach back to the date of the original offer” so as to enhance damage awards and give the patentee an earlier opportunity to obtain injunctive relief to block a pending sale); Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 613, 623-24 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (arguing that
interpreting the “offer to sell” language to give a patentee more than the right to
“sue . . . for infringement at an earlier stage” would essentially extend the coverage of a
U.S. patent to prohibit activities abroad that are not otherwise infringing).
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B. Distinguishing “Offer To Sell” (Infringement) from “Offer” (Contract Law)
and “On Sale” (Patentability Bar)
Two convenient references may be used as guides towards determining what constitutes an infringing “offer to sell.” In general, “offer” has acquired a well circumscribed meaning based on centuries of
97
contract law jurisprudence. In the context of U.S. patent law, there
98
has been extensive interpretation of the “on sale” patentability bar,
culminating in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, in which the Supreme Court
99
decisively addressed this statutory language. However, distinguishing
features of the infringement context render both metrics partially inapposite to the task of defining the parameters of an infringing “offer
to sell.”
Using an economic rationale, the narrow contractual meaning of
“offer” is inadequate to protect the economic rights of a patentee in
100
her invention.
A broader lay meaning of “offer” would better protect a patentee from commercial activity having the potential to erode
the market price for the patented article since it would encompass
promotional activities more akin to commercialization or marketing
(rather than sale per se) of the invention such as advertisements, so-

97

See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 3.3, at 112-13 (defining an offer as “a
manifestation to another of assent to enter into a contract” through which “the offeror
thus confers upon the offeree the power to create a contract”). But see RICHARD A.
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:7 (4th ed. 1990) (“Though the general rule is
that an advertisement, circular, price list, quotation or the like is not an offer, there is
no doubt that a positive offer may be made even by an advertisement or other similar
general notice.”).
98
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . .
the invention was . . . on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of
application for patent . . . .”).
99
525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). The current application of the “on sale” bar is governed
by the interpretation of Pfaff, which requires both that “the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale” and that “the invention must be ready for patenting” by virtue of either actual or constructive reduction to practice. Id. The rule has
been applied by the CAFC in several cases, including: Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus.,
Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1352-55 (Fed. Cir. 2002), EZ Dock v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347,
1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041,
1046-59 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
100
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 3.3, at 112-13 (setting forth a definition of
“offer” as applied in contract law).
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101

licitations, mailings, and proposals. It is these activities-–and not just
formal contractual offers—that have the potential, under the rubric of
“offers for sale,” to cause detrimental erosion of a patentee’s exclusive
102
right.
By contrast, the narrowest suggested interpretation of the term,
that “offer to sell” infringement functions as a cause of action merely
to advance the date at which a patentee may sue to enjoin a putatively
103
infringing sale, is so limited that it would practically eviscerate the
statute, rendering it nearly incapable of preventing the economic con104
sequences of activities conducted in preparation for a such a sale.
Under this limited interpretation, an offer to sell incapable of resulting in an infringing sale would not be considered infringement despite the detrimental market impact that may accrue to the pat105
entee.
Similarly, there are substantial impediments to drawing a straightforward analogy between the “on sale” bar of § 102(b) and the “offered for sale” prohibition of § 271(a). The two statutes serve differ101

See Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale,” supra note 16, at 798 (positing
that price erosion due to competition is the main deleterious economic consequence
of infringing offers for sale, and arguing that the United States should adopt a broad
interpretation of “offer to sell” to “more appropriately protect the patentee’s interests”); Morishita, supra note 16, at 909 (contrasting “the legal definition of ‘offer’” with
“the lay meaning that equates an offer to a proposal or solicitation [and that] would
probably include advertisements and promotional efforts”).
102
See Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale,” supra note 16, at 798 (“Price erosion can result from competitor activity that falls short of a formal commercial offer.”).
103
See Irving & Lewis, supra note 96, at 352 (“The main consequence of requiring
an actual sale during the patent term in order to make the offer for sale an act of infringement appears to be that the date of infringement will reach back to the date of
the original offer.”); see also Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp., 75
F. Supp. 2d 613, 623-24 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“The language of the statute and the cases
make it clear that expanding the list of infringing activities . . . to include an ‘offer to
sell’ rather than merely a ‘sale’ protects a patent holder at an earlier stage of infringing
activity.”).
104
See Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale,” supra note 16, at 798 (suggesting
that a narrow interpretation of “offer to sell” would not protect patent holders from
price erosion).
105
A tangible example of such a scenario would be a variation on the facts of Rotec
Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 2000), discussed in
Part II.C, where an offer to sell a patented article indisputably occurs in the United
States but the elements of the actual sale (i.e., delivery and payment) are contemplated
to occur in a foreign country. A narrow interpretation relying on actual sale is also
problematic since it runs counter to the plain text and structure of § 271(a), which
places “offer to sell” on par with “make, use, and sell,” enumerating each as a distinct
infringing activity. See Sulkis, supra note 16, at 1124-26 (arguing that any other “interpretation . . . violates the standard maxim of statutory construction that an interpretation of a statute should not render any other portion of the statute meaningless”).
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106

ent, albeit complementary, policies that arise out of the constitutional mandate “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
107
their . . . Discoveries.” Further, such a narrow construal of “offer for
108
sale” in § 271(a) ignores the larger context of the “on sale” bar
among the other conditions for loss of right to patent prescribed in §
102(b), an error in focus that both commentators and the Federal
109
Circuit have made.
The Federal Circuit has recognized that the policy reasons for the
“on sale” bar are generally geared towards promoting dissemination of
inventions, and include allowing inventors a grace period to evaluate
the commercial potential of an invention while preventing patentees
from unreasonably extending the time-span of exclusivity, “encouraging prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions to the public,
[and] discouraging the removal of inventions from the public do110
main.” This provision acts as the “stick” with regard to the inventor,
assuring that the invention will enter the public domain as soon as is
reasonably possible, either by forfeiture of patent rights or by expiration of the patent, and serves to temporally circumscribe an inventor’s
111
rights.
By contrast, the “offer to sell” infringement protection is directed
112
at promoting investment in the commercialization of inventions.
106

Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1255 n.3 (contrasting the policy rationales underlying the
“on-sale” prohibition with “offer to sell” infringement liability). Contra Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale,” supra note 16, at 777-78 (arguing that the rationales are
economically the same because although one ostensibly limits the patent holder’s enjoyment of the patent’s value to the patent term (plus the grace period) and the other
limits the rights of others to enjoy that value, the value protected by both is the same).
107
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
108
See supra note 99 (discussing the interpretation of an offer under the “on sale”
patentability bar).
109
See, e.g., Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale,” supra note 16, at 780-81 (failing to recognize that § 102(b) also bars a patent if the invention is described in a
printed publication more than one year before an application for patent is filed); see
also Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1254-56 (comparing the “offered for sale” prohibition of §
271(a) with only the “on sale” bar portion of § 102(b)).
110
3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
111
See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (“Consistent with [the constitutional mandate], § 102 of the Patent Act serves as a limiting provision, both excluding ideas that are already in the public domain from patent protection and confining the duration of the monopoly to the statutory term.”).
112
See Johnson & Johnson Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Servs. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1071 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (“Discovery of and commercialization of new things is notoriously riskladen, yet it is the inventor and the innovator, those whose ingenuity and ambition
create new things while taking the risk of loss, who provide the basis of industrial advance and economic growth.”); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rea-
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This provision acts as the “carrot” with regard to the inventor, assuring
that money spent manufacturing, promoting, and commercializing
the patented invention will benefit only the inventor, by prolonging
the first-mover advantage and preventing copiers from free-riding on
113
the inventor’s investments for a predictable time period.
The statutory language surrounding the “on sale” bar defines
other activities, in addition to a commercial offer for sale, that may
create an absolute bar to patentability. A printed publication antedating the patent application by one year or more is an equally effective
114
patentability bar, as long as it conveys the invention with sufficient
particularity that a person having ordinary skill in the art is thereby
115
placed in possession of the invention.
It is established that “printed
116
publication” is a “unitary concept,” defined not by the medium of
117
publication but by whether there is “‘sufficient proof of its dissemisoning that research and development expenditures are only valuable to the public if
“there are suitable incentives to invest in commercialization [, i.e.,] a chance of reasonable profits from risk taking” (quoting Irving S. Shapiro, Chairman, E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., Technology’s Decline: America’s Self-Made Paradox (Jan. 22, 1979),
in 45 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 360, 364 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
113
See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Congress made the policy choice that the ‘carrot’ of an exclusive market for the patented
goods would encourage patentees to commercialize the protected inventions so that
the public would enjoy the benefits of the new technology during the patent term in
exchange for granting a limited patent monopoly.”).
114
In addition to barring patent protection for an invention that was on sale in the
United States for more than one year prior to filing the patent application, § 102(b)
bars entitlement to a patent if “the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication” anywhere in the world, also with the same one year grace period. 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
115
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68; see also The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 536 (1888)
(holding that an invention can be sufficiently reduced to practice in writing if the inventor “describes his method with sufficient clearness and precision to enable those
skilled in the matter to understand what the process is [and] points out some practicable way of putting it into operation”).
116
In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (advising that the phrase is not to
be parsed to analyze “printed” and “publication” independently).
117
This is true regardless “whether information is printed, handwritten, or on
microfilm or a magnetic disc or tape, etc.” Id. at 227. Additionally, because “[t]he
statutory phrase ‘printed publication’ has been interpreted to give effect to ongoing
advances in the technologies of data storage, retrieval, and dissemination,” a wide variety of nontraditional publications qualify. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir.
1986). Even Internet web pages, sales brochures, pamphlets, and instruction booklets
qualify as printed publications, at least when they are generally accessible to some segment of the public, regardless of the means or the number of persons who have access.
See Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 494 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1974) (“To constitute a printed publication for purposes of the publication bar, all that is required is
that the document in question be printed and so disseminated as to provide wide pub-
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nation or that it has otherwise been available and accessible to persons
118
concerned with the art to which the document relates.’”
Therefore, notwithstanding the prevailing interpretation of the
“on sale” portion of the § 102(b) language, the patentability bar statute encompasses many activities that may be categorized as advertising, marketing, soliciting, and commercializing—the precursors to
“offers” under contract law that are not sales per se but are intended
to generate sales. Since the purpose of § 271(a) is to provide a complementary economic incentive to § 102(b), “offer to sell” infringement should also encompass such nascent sales activities. Viewing the
“on sale” portion of § 102(b) in its full textual context both leaves un119
disturbed Pfaff’s holding and remains faithful to the parallels drawn
120
in Rotec, yet permits a broad interpretation of § 271(a) that is more
conducive to effectively protecting against diminishment of a patentee’s exclusive right by pre-sale commercialization activities.
C. The Federal Circuit’s Interpretation of “Offer To Sell”
Since the addition of “offer to sell” patent infringement, the CAFC
has considered only three “offer to sell” cases that had been adjudicated on the merits in district court: Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
121
Corp., MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon
122
123
Corp., and Fieldturf International, Inc. v. Sprinturf, Inc.
In Rotec, the
court had its first bona fide opportunity to consider the meaning of

lic access to it.” (citing Pickering v. Holman, 659 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1972); Deep
Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 417 F.2d 1227, 1235 (7th Cir. 1969); Jockmus v. Leviton, 28 F.2d 812, 813 (2d Cir. 1928))).
118
In re Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226 (quoting Philips Elec. & Pharm. Indus. Corp. v.
Thermal & Elec. Indus., Inc., 450 F.2d 1164, 1171 (3d Cir. 1971)).
119
525 U.S. at 67 (interpreting the § 102(b) “on sale” bar as applicable where the
product is both “the subject of a commercial offer for sale” and “ready for patenting”).
120
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(relying on Pfaff to analogize the meaning of “offers to sell” in § 271(a) with that of “on
sale” in § 102(b)). See infra Part II.C (discussing the Rotec court’s application of the
Pfaff analysis of the “on sale” bar to interpret “offer to sell” in accordance with contract
law).
121
215 F.3d 1246, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court’s order granting summary judgment of noninfringement).
122
420 F.3d 1369, 1382-88 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming the part of the district
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the alleged infringers with respect to direct infringement).
123
433 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court’s order granting summary judgment of noninfringement).
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124

the statutory language.
In MEMC, the court found no evidence of
activities occurring in the United States that could constitute an “offer
125
to sell” the patented device, and thus affirmed.
MEMC applied the
126
Rotec test and relied heavily on the analysis in 3D Systems.
Fieldturf
cited Rotec but did not rely on it, instead basing its decision on the district court’s finding that the product allegedly offered for sale was not
127
the patented product but a noninfringing equivalent.
Rotec involved the allegedly infringing offer for sale of plaintiff Rotec’s patented conveyor system to the Chinese government for use in
128
the Three Gorges Dam project on the Yangtze River.
Critical to the
resolution of the case was the fact that defendants Mitsubishi, Potain,
129
Johnson, and Tucker submitted a joint bid proposal to the Chinese
government; none of the defendants was a subcontractor and the only
sales transaction was to be between the joint bidders and their Chinese
130
government customer.
The district court ultimately granted sum131
mary judgment for the defendants after “finding insufficient evi-

124

In full recognition of this task, the court devoted extensive discussion to the
historical background of the “offer to sell” infringement provision. See Rotec, 215 F.3d
at 1253 (“We must still decide, however, what constitutes an ‘offer’ as that term is used
in § 271(a).”).
125
420 F.3d at 1377.
126
See id. at 1376 (citing Rotec and 3D Systems in analyzing what is an “offer to sell”
under § 271(a)). Because MEMC did not alter the analysis of Rotec or 3D Systems, it will
not be considered further in this Comment.
127
433 F.3d at 1370. Fieldturf did not change the law as set out in the prior “offer
to sell” cases and will not be considered further in this Comment.
128
Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1248-49. Rotec Industries, an Illinois corporation, held U.S.
Patent No. 4,170,291 (filed Mar. 7, 1978) (issued Oct. 9, 1979) covering the conveyor
system at issue. Id. at 1248. Sale of the patented conveyor system was also alleged;
however, since the sale itself occurred abroad, it was not covered by the U.S. patent
laws. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 810, 814 (C.D. Ill. 1998);
Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1248-49, 1251; see Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laithram Corp., 406 U.S.
518, 531 (1972) (“Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect.”).
129
Mitsubishi Corporation, a Japanese corporation, and Mitsubishi International,
a New York corporation, are referred to collectively as “Mitsubishi.” Potain, a French
corporation, and Johnson, an Illinois corporation, were jointly working on a conveyor
system design and were solicited by Mitsubishi to put in a joint bid to the Chinese government. Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1249. Tucker Associates, an Oregon corporation (operated by Gary Tucker, an individual domiciled in Oregon), was brought in by Johnson
as an independent contractor to help prepare the bid. Id.
130
Id. at 1248-50, 1255.
131
Summary judgment was granted as to Mitsubishi and Tucker. Id. at 1250.
Johnson was dropped from the complaint after filing for bankruptcy, and Potain was
dismissed by the district court for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1249 n.1.
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dence of an offer to sell within the United States,” and Rotec appealed.
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the CAFC focused
on the meaning of the statutory language of § 271(a); the defendants
did not dispute that they had offered to sell the invention claimed in
the subject patent, but instead argued for summary judgment only on
133
the basis that the offer was not made in the United States.
Therefore, the court recognized that summary judgment would be improper
if, as a matter of law, the alleged infringer’s “activities in the United
States, as would be construed by a reasonable jury, [we]re sufficient to
134
establish an ‘offer for sale,’ as that phrase is used in § 271(a).”
The Rotec court embraced an interpretation of “‘offer to sell’ liabil135
ity according to the norms of traditional contract analysis,” an ap136
proach held to be consistent with the recent Pfaff analysis of the “on
137
sale” bar.
In so doing, the court casually dismissed the broader lay
definition applied in 3D Systems, which had encompassed price quota138
tion letters as qualifying “offers to sell” under § 271(a), recognizing,
perhaps speciously, that the 3D Systems decision did not benefit from
139
the insight of Pfaff.
Noting the international pedigree of the “offer
132

Id. at 1250. Although substantial activity among the bidders prior to their contract with the Chinese government occurred in the United States, and the defendants
did not dispute that an offer to sell was made by the joint bidders to the Chinese government, the district court found that the critical acts of finalizing and presenting the
bid proposal, negotiating with the Chinese government, and signing the sales agreement all occurred in China or Hong Kong. Id.
133
Id. at 1251. This is essentially the same argument that prevailed in the district
court. See Rotec, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 817 (granting summary judgment for the defendants
on the ground that “no genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether an actual ‘offer
to sell’ was made by Defendants in the United States”). An alternative defense may
have been based on the contention that the intended sale would not have occurred in
the United States, but the district court did not need to reach that issue. Id. at 815
(noting the plaintiff’s contention that “while the contract eventually signed provided
for procurement and manufacturing to occur in China and Japan, there was a question
of fact regarding whether the bid proposal made by Defendants to the Chinese buyer
contemplated the manufacture of the conveyor components in the United States”).
134
Rotec, 251 F.3d at 1251.
135
Id. at 1254-55.
136
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68; see also supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing the “on sale” bar as interpreted in Pfaff).
137
Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1254. The CAFC also held the traditional contract meaning
of “offer to sell” to be consistent with its earlier analysis of the term “sale or importation” under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(2000)). Id. at 1255.
138
3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs. Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see
supra Part I.B (discussing the analysis of “offer to sell” in 3D Systems).
139
Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1254. 3D Systems was decided two days after Pfaff.
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140

to sell” provision of § 271(a), the court also briefly considered, and
141
ultimately rejected, the broader interpretation of the parallel “offer
142
to dispose of” provision in the United Kingdom patent code.
Ultimately, the distinctions between broader and narrower meanings of “offer to sell” did not impact the decision in Rotec, as the plaintiff lost on the facts by failing to show evidence of any communication
in the United States between the alleged infringer and a third party
140

See supra note 1 (detailing the effect of TRIPs on U.S. patent law). It is generally recognized that the U.S. patent laws have no extraterritorial reach. See Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (“Our patent system makes no
claim to extraterritorial effect.”); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d
1026, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that “a U.S. patent grants rights to exclude
others from making, using and selling the patented invention only in the United States”).
Additionally, there is a long tradition of interpreting U.S. patent laws in the federal
courts, with patent infringement cases dating to the early years of the nation. E.g.,
Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 11,710) (cited by HERBERT
F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 233 (4th ed. 2003), as the first patent case
tried to a jury in the United States); Morse v. Reed, 17 F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1796)
(No. 9860). Nevertheless, because international harmonization of the multitude of
national patent laws is arguably an underlying purpose of TRIPs, it is not entirely implausible that U.S. courts should consider the interpretation of similar provisions
abroad. Compare Lisa B. Martin & Susan L. Amster, International Intellectual Property
Protections in the New GATT Accord, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Feb. 1994, at 9, 9 (hailing TRIPs
as “a far-reaching plan that attempts to strengthen and harmonize the standards of
intellectual property protection offered throughout the world”), and Adam Isaac Hasson, Note, Domestic Implementation of International Obligations: The Quest for World Patent
Law Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 373, 388 (2002) (concluding that
TRIPs, “while imperfect, has taken unprecedented steps towards the harmonization of
world patent law”), with John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 686 (2002) (questioning the merits of complete international
harmonization of patent law).
141
See Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1253 (declaring that “we must ultimately decide this issue
as a matter of United States law”). Unless the Federal Circuit reconsiders the value of
international case law in construing the “offer to sell” statutory language, any reasoning relying on it is probably consigned to dissenting opinions and law review articles as
a theory with strong rhetorical but weak practical value.
142
The U.K. Patents Act provides for infringement liability when a person “makes,
disposes of, offers to dispose of, uses or imports” a patented product and the prohibited act is done in the U.K. “while the patent is in force.” Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, pt. I,
§ 60(1)(a) (Eng.). Gerber Garment Technology Inc. v. Lectra Systems Ltd., [1995] 13 R.P.C.
383, 411 (U.K. Patents Ct.), broadly interpreted an infringing “offer to dispose of” to
extend beyond the bounds of traditional contract law. Indeed, recognizing that this
aspect of English patent law derives from the Community Patent Convention, the Gerber court held that “[a] party who approaches potential customers . . . by advertisement
saying he is willing to supply a machine, terms to be agreed, is offering it” and that so
“disturbing the patentee’s monopoly” is infringement. Id. at 412. The Community
Patent Convention to which Gerber referred, embodied in Council Directive 89/695/
EEC, Agreement Relating to Community Patents, art. 25(a), 1989 O.J. (L 401) 1, 14,
provides that the proprietor of a Community patent has the right to prevent third parties “from making, offering, putting on the market or using” the patented product
without the proprietor’s consent.
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resulting in “commercial detriment [to] the rightful patentee.”
Therefore, there was no infringing “offer to sell” under § 271(a). The
resolution of Rotec on the merits based on the absence of an “offer to
sell” is in stark contrast to the analyses of procedural motions in 3D
Systems and HollyAnne, which applied the results of their respective
substantive “offer to sell” analyses only to resolve the propriety of the
144
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
Unfortunately, there is insufficient information in the Rotec district
court opinion to determine the basis upon which personal jurisdiction
existed over the defendants; the court merely noted that a defendant
domiciled in France was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction
while defendants domiciled in Japan and Oregon were held to ac145
count.
3D Systems and HollyAnne cast uncertainty upon whether the
CAFC in Rotec would have exercised specific personal jurisdiction over
any of the defendants based only upon the activities within the United
146
States that were at issue in the case.
III. KEEPING THE SUBSTANTIVE “OFFER TO SELL” INFRINGEMENT
ANALYSIS DISTINCT FROM THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION DETERMINATION
Meaningful enforcement of “offer to sell” patent infringement requires that a patentee be able to obtain personal jurisdiction over an
alleged infringer based on the allegedly infringing activities in the forum. In many situations, such enforcement is contingent upon
whether the in-forum contacts needed to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction are distinguishable from the activities needed to
constitute an infringing “offer to sell.”
Therefore, the question posed in this Comment may be viewed
from two perspectives. First, in what cases could an infringing “offer
to sell” exist where personal jurisdiction would not legitimately be authorized? Conversely, in what cases could personal jurisdiction be
proper where there is not an infringing “offer to sell”? The second
143

Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1255. Simply put, because § 271(a) requires an “offer[] to
sell . . . within the United States,” an offer to sell occurring abroad lacks one of the
required elements of infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
144
See supra Part I.B (discussing the interpretation of “offer to sell” in 3D Systems
and HollyAnne).
145
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 810, 812 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
Perhaps sufficient in-forum contacts existed for the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over each remaining defendant.
146
See supra Part I.B (discussing the Federal Circuit’s adjudication of personal jurisdiction in the context of “offer to sell” infringement actions in 3D Systems and HollyAnne).
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147

prong of the Akro test renders the first scenario a virtual impossibility; an alleged “offer to sell” qualifying under the statutory meaning of
§ 271(a) will almost certainly also satisfy the “arises out of or relates to”
148
criterion for personal jurisdiction.
On the other hand, there should be many cases where personal
jurisdiction can legitimately be found based on allegedly purposefully
directed “offer to sell” activities but where there is ultimately no in149
fringing “offer to sell” under § 271(a). These cases provide the driving reason for keeping the two determinations distinct. If the “offer to
sell” provision of § 271(a) is to have any teeth—any real power to deter infringement—it is essential that courts take jurisdiction of such
cases based on reasonable allegations of “offers to sell” without first
having to determine substantively whether the statutory language is
150
met.

147

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Perhaps an exception could occur in a reasonableness of due process situation
where the alleged “offer to sell” is masked from the defendant by virtue of the defendant being a subvendor to the party making the actual offer (and thus fails on the
third Akro prong). Cf. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114
(1987) (holding that the assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant would be
unreasonable under a due process analysis, given the severe burden on the defendant
and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum in pursuing the litigation). Ecological Systems Technology v. Aquatic Wildlife Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Mass. 2000), may
be such a case. The primary defendant, Aquatic, suffered a default judgment for failure to plead or otherwise defend. Id. at 123. However, the secondary defendant, U.S.
Aquarium, successfully moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis
that it was simply a contract manufacturer who “had no knowledge of any infringement
and ceased manufacturing the patented aquarium system [for Aquatic] upon” learning
of the allegation. Id. It may even be dubious to term this type of case an exception
since the disconnect is that the actual offer was made by a party other than the one
over whom personal jurisdiction is sought.
Another exception may occur if the alleged “offer to sell” activity could be deemed
not purposefully directed to the forum as required by the first Akro prong. However, as
is discussed in Part III.B, the first and third prongs of Akro are really two sides of the
same coin—the underlying reason for the purposeful availment requirement is to
evaluate the reasonableness of the assertion of personal jurisdiction.
149
Part III.A addresses some cases that may fall into this category. In particular,
see infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (discussing cases that differentiated
between the personal jurisdiction and “offer to sell” determinations) and notes 164-81
and accompanying text (discussing cases where personal jurisdiction may have been
proper but was denied due to conflation of the two analyses).
150
Indeed, the CAFC recognized in Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21
F.3d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994), that when “[t]he cause of action for patent infringement is alleged to arise out of [the defendant’s in-forum] activities[, n]o more is usually required to establish specific jurisdiction.”
148

1312

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154:1283

A. Mixed Decisions in the District Courts
The lack of clarity in the “offer to sell” infringement doctrine engendered by the Federal Circuit analysis in 3D Systems, HollyAnne, and
Rotec has rippled down to create disparate approaches in district court
decisions. There are at least three categories of “offer to sell” decisions based on motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction:
those wisely avoiding a substantive determination of whether the al151
leged activities constitute an infringing “offer to sell”; those harmlessly conflating the issues, finding the alleged activities sufficient for
152
both infringement and personal jurisdiction purposes; and those
conflating the issues and dismissing cases that probably should have
survived to be adjudicated, even if those cases ultimately would have
progressed no farther than summary judgment disposition on the
153
merits.
Avoiding the substantive “offer to sell” determination in deciding
on the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction recognizes the importance both of procedural posture and of giving a putatively meritorious suit its day in court. In applying the second prong of the Akro
154
test, the court in Recycling Sciences International, Inc. v. Soil Restoration
and Recycling, L.L.C. found that since the actions alleged in the complaint “arise out of or directly relate to [the defendant’s in-forum] ac155
tivities . . . [,] specific jurisdiction [over the defendant] exists.”
Similarly, the court in Wafios Machinery Corp. v. Nucoil Industries Co.
recognized the low burden on the plaintiff to make merely a prima
facie showing in the face of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
156
jurisdiction, denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss and instead
granting the plaintiff’s request for additional discovery on the “offer
151

See, e.g., Wafios Mach. Corp. v. Nucoil Indus. Co., No. 03 Civ. 9865 (RWS), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13674, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2004); Recycling Scis. Int’l, Inc. v.
Soil Restoration & Recycling, L.L.C., No. 00 C 0311, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12989, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2001).
152
See, e.g., Sitrick v. Freehand Sys., Inc., No. 02 C 1568, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21140, at *9-16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2002); Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Dawson Int’l
Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 754, 761-62 (N.D. Ind. 2002); Biometics, L.L.C. v. New Womyn,
Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 869, 873-74 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
153
See, e.g., Moldflow Corp. v. Simcon, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41-44 (D. Mass.
2003); USA Payments, Inc. v. Hotel Ramada of Nev., No. C-01-1450 VRW, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9493, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2001).
154
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
155
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12989, at *8, denying reconsideration of Recycling Scis. Int’l,
Inc. v. Soil Restoration and Recycling, L.L.C, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
156
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (reviewing the procedural burdens
involved in a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).
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157

to sell” issue.
Presumably, on rehearing, the plaintiff will have the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Akro
158
three-prong test is satisfied.
Conflating the personal jurisdiction and substantive “offer to sell”
issues is doctrinally problematic, but when a court ultimately declines
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the effects of the error are
ameliorated for the particular case at hand. The court in International
Truck & Engine Corp. v. Dawson International Inc. reached a bit too far,
falling into the trap set by the 3D Systems analysis of the second Akro
159
prong, yet held that personal jurisdiction existed because the defendant’s activities qualified as an “offer to sell” from which the cause
160
of action arose.
Following the same line of reasoning, the holding
of Sitrick v. Freehand Systems, Inc. hinged on the critical second Akro
prong issue of whether the defendant’s in-forum activities constituted
161
a substantive “offer to sell” under § 271(a).
In Biometrics, L.L.C. v.
New Womyn, Inc., the court held that the second Akro prong was satisfied, in part because the “defendants’ Internet web site constitute[d]
an offer to sell” since it “include[d] a detailed description of the
162
product and its price” and was moderately interactive.
In all three
cases, a well pleaded alleged infringing “offer to sell” nominally arising
from or related to the in-forum activities should have been enough for
157

No. 03 Civ. 9865, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13674, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. July 21,

2004).
158

Supra notes 33-35, 43-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussing the 3D Systems analysis
of the second prong of the Akro test).
160
216 F. Supp. 2d 754, 761-62 (N.D. Ind. 2002).
161
No. 02-C-1568, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21140, at *9-16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2002).
The court ultimately decided that the “mailing [of] brochures, sample parts, and price
quotation letters” met the requirements of an “offer to sell.” Id. at *10.
162
112 F. Supp. 2d 869, 873-74 (E.D. Mo. 2000); cf. Recycling Scis. Int’l, Inc. v.
Four Seasons Envtl., Inc., No. 03-C-6460, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6572, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 16, 2004) (finding a passive web site insufficient to convey specific personal jurisdiction by way of an offer to sell). The burgeoning topic of Internet-based contacts for
purposes of specific personal jurisdiction is largely based on the “sliding scale” of interactivity set forth in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,
1124-25 (W.D. Pa. 1997). See generally Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002); Susan Nauss Exon, A New Shoe Is Needed To Walk
Through Cyberspace Jurisdiction, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2000); Felix C. Pelzer, Unchartered Territory: Personal Jurisdiction in the Internet Age, 51 S.C. L. REV. 745 (2000);
Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1998); Frederick H. Bicknese, Comment, Websites and Personal Jurisdiction: When Should a Defendant’s Internet Selling Activities Subject It to Suit in a
Plaintiff-Buyer’s State?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 829 (2000); Daniel Steuer, Comment, The Shoe
Fits and the Lighter Is Out of Gas: The Continuing Utility of International Shoe and the Misuse and Ineffectiveness of Zippo, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 319 (2003).
159
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each respective court to exercise subject matter and personal jurisdiction without needing to reach the substantive issue of whether in fact
163
there was an “offer to sell.”
More troubling are the cases where personal jurisdiction may have
been proper but was denied by courts not confining their assessments
to the matter presented in the motion to dismiss. In Moldflow Corp. v.
Simcon, Inc., the court logically found the first prong of Akro to be satisfied and correctly enunciated the standard for the second prong of
Akro as requiring the “plaintiffs [to] make a prima facie showing” that
their claim “arises out of or relates to” the defendant’s in-forum con164
tacts.
Surprisingly, the court then launched into a detailed exploration of the meaning of the “offer to sell” language of § 271(a) and
165
whether the alleged acts fell within that meaning.
After first acknowledging that under the 3D Systems analysis of the second Akro
166
prong the plaintiff’s case would survive the lack of personal jurisdic167
tion motion,
the court wholeheartedly embraced the Rotec ap168
proach that was hatched in an entirely different procedural con169
170
text.
Then, latching onto the “on sale” bar analogy and the requirement that the “invention [be] the subject of a commercial offer
171
for sale” as understood in traditional contract law, the court determined that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the second Akro prong
172
and declined to take jurisdiction of the case.
173
In analysis reminiscent of HollyAnne, the court in USA Payments,
Inc. v. Hotel Ramada of Nevada dismissed for lack of personal jurisdic163

See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1988)
(stating that the well-pleaded complaint rule applies to 28 U.S.C § 1338(a) jurisdiction
over patent cases in the same manner as it has long been held to apply to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 federal question cases).
164
296 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41 (D. Mass. 2003).
165
Id. at 41-44.
166
See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
167
296 F. Supp. 2d at 41-42.
168
See supra notes -37 and accompanying text.
169
296 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43 (distinguishing 3D Systems and choosing to follow Rotec).
170
See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (explaining the Rotec application
of Pfaff).
171
296 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (quoting Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d
1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and citing Elan Corp., PLC v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 272 F.
Supp. 2d 1325, 1338-40 (S.D. Fla. 2002), for post-Pfaff elaboration of the “on sale” bar
analysis).
172
Id. at 43-45.
173
See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of the meaning of “offer to sell” in HollyAnne).
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tion, holding that an “offer to use an allegedly infringing product”
174
does not constitute an “offer to sell” under § 271(a).
Besides ignoring the fact that all of the claims of the subject patent covered a
175
method and not a product, the court looked for more than was required to meet the second prong of Akro and failed to find it. The
court essentially admitted that the cause of action arose out of the de176
fendant’s purposefully directed activities in the forum, activities by
which the defendant derived a financial benefit and received the “pro177
tection of [the] laws” of the forum, but dismissed anyway based on
178
its premature substantive finding. As a result, the patentees in these
two cases were effectively prevented from having their colorable claims
179
adjudicated on the merits with the benefit of discovery and other
180
evidentiary devices afforded by a trial.
Instead their cases were dismissed for essentially substantive reasons, cloaked in the guise of procedural grounds, based only on the preliminary record of the plead181
ings and motion briefs.
B. Effective “Offer To Sell” Infringement Liability
Requires a Different Analysis
The protection of patent rights requires that a patentee be able to
hale an alleged infringer into court where a substantive statutory in-

174

No. C-01-1450 VRW, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9493, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 21,

2001).
175

See U.S. Patent No. 6,081,792 (filed Jan. 15, 1998) (issued June 27, 2000).
USA Payments, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9493, at *7 (“To be sure, plaintiff has
demonstrated that defendant affirmatively markets and promotes the [alleged infringing method and product] to [in-forum] residents through newspaper advertisements,
direct mailings and other programs directed at [the forum].”).
177
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
178
USA Payments, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9493, at *7-8. Unfortunately, the court
construed the law in a manner that would make it impossible to “offer to sell” a patented method, instead characterizing such an offer as an “offer to use.” Id. at *8. In
fact, the court seemed unable to conceptualize that a method can be patented, repeatedly referring to the invention as a “system” and a “product.” See, e.g., id. at *7-8 (“An
offer to use an allegedly infringing product, by itself, does not constitute patent infringement.” (emphasis added)).
179
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 30-36.
180
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 43, FED. R. EVID. 101-1103. Consider also the potential impact of the availability of a jury trial under FED. R. CIV. P. 38 per the Eighth
Amendment, as opposed to a preliminary disposition by a judge under FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(2), which allows a pleader to move to dismiss for “lack of jurisdiction over the
person.”
181
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 7, 8, 12.
176
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182

quiry can occur.
Toward that end, there must be a viable set of criteria by which a court can exert personal jurisdiction over an alleged
defendant based solely on the purportedly infringing acts occurring
183
within the forum. In the wake of International Shoe v. Washington, the
fundamental specific personal jurisdiction examination hinges on due
process—whether the exercise of such jurisdiction would be fair and
reasonable, that is, whether a defendant purposefully availed herself
of the laws of the forum and could have anticipated being subjected to
184
a suit there based on her in-forum activities.
Unfortunately, in de185
vising its own version of the test in Akro, the CAFC constructed a
framework that diverts the primary focus of the test from the basic due
process issue to a particular yardstick by which due process is to be
measured, that of a nexus between the in-forum activities on which
specific jurisdiction hangs and the cause of action sought to be
186
tried.
In the creation and application of its test for specific personal jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit—bringing along many district courts
who have followed its lead—has lost sight of the origins of its test.
Typically, the personal jurisdiction inquiry consists of two steps: inquiring whether the long-arm statute of the forum reaches the defendant by virtue of activities within the forum, and then examining
whether the exercise of the resultant jurisdiction comports with due
187
process.
The key to the problem identified in this Comment is that
182

As with any statutorily created private cause of action, the means for individual
enforcement of rights under the patent infringement statute is via civil suit. See 35
U.S.C. § 281 (2000) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of
his patent.”).
183
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
184
BORN, supra note 32, at 74-76; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 475 (1985) (“[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“[T]he defendant’s conduct
and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.”).
185
Supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
186
See Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1546-47 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (examining the
defendant’s “purposefully directed activities” in the forum and “their relationship to
the cause of action”).
187
See BORN, supra note 32, at 67-68 (illuminating the critical distinction between
two separate requirements for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction: there must be
a legislative grant of authority, and the “exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to [that
grant] must be consistent with the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution”); see
also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 463-64, 471-78 (discussing reasons why a forum may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident within the Due Process Clause, after ac-
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the CAFC’s second Akro prong, the “arises out of or relates to” criterion, has its genesis in the first step (i.e., the reach of the long-arm
188
statute) of the conventional inquiry.
In the opening sentence of
Burger King, cited in Akro as the origin of the “relationship to the cause
189
of action” prong, the Court propounded that “[t]he State of Florida’s long-arm statute extends jurisdiction [over a person] so long as
190
the cause of action arises from [the alleged in-forum activities].”
The Federal Circuit mixed up the personal jurisdiction analysis in
Akro, inserting an emancipated manifestation of the conventional
long-arm step as a second prong sandwiched between the first and
third prongs that each address different aspects of the due process
191
step.
In doing so, the CAFC divorced from its roots in the long-arm
statutes the idea that the cause of action must bear a relationship to
knowledging that the Florida long-arm statute was sufficiently broad to permit jurisdiction over the defendant); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
412-15 (1984) (evaluating whether a foreign corporation’s activities had sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state to comply with the Due Process Clause and
noting that the Texas long-arm statute reaches to the limits of Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-12 (1977) (analyzing the relationship between “the defendant, the State, and the litigation” in the context of the Due
Process Clause).
188
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) provides for exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
over patent matters in the federal courts, it does not confer personal jurisdiction via
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(D). It is unclear whether service of process would be effective
in this context under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2), which provides that “serving a summons
or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to claims arising under federal
law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state,” a condition
that appears to be met due to the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction in patent cases.
Regardless, the Federal Circuit analyzes these cases under the long-arm statute of the
state in which the district court hearing the case sits, presumably by way of FED. R. CIV.
P. 4(k)(1)(A). See, e.g., 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Lab., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (deferring to the California long-arm statute); Akro, 45 F.3d at 1544 (laboring under the Ohio long-arm statute).
189
Akro, 45 F.3d at 1547.
190
471 U.S. at 462, 463-64 (citing FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(g) (Supp. 1984)). Burger
King in turn references Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, which drew its “arises out of” language from the Texas long-arm statute, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon
1964 & Supp. 1982-1983). Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472-73. In a poor bit of citation, the
Helicopteros Court appears to attribute the statutory language “arises out of” to Shaffer,
433 U.S. at 204, even though the phrase never appears in that case. Helicopteros, 466
U.S. at 414. Instead, the Shaffer analysis focuses on the relatedness of the cause of action, the defendant, and the forum. 433 U.S. at 204.
191
See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (noting that a due process determination requires both “purposeful minimum
contacts” and satisfaction of the “minimum requirements inherent in the concept of
fair play and substantial justice” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 121-22 (1987))).
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192

the contacts from which it arises.
Instead, the Federal Circuit has
fostered the growth of this criterion into a separate and essential element of the due process step, creating a predicament that significantly
impacts the handling of personal jurisdiction motions in “offer to sell”
infringement litigation.
It is unarguable that the closeness of the relationship between the
cause of action and the defendant’s in-forum activities may be an important factor in determining fairness and due process, but whether
the cause of action “arises out of” those activities is not the sine qua
193
non of a due process inquiry.
Satisfaction of due process “must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the pur194
pose of the due process clause to insure.”
By wedding itself to the
195
rigid second Akro prong, the Federal Circuit has turned a factor into
a standard and has distorted the due process test to the detriment of
plaintiffs—patentees in the case of “offer to sell” infringement suits—
who seek to vindicate their statutory and constitutional rights.
Recognizing the origin of the problem—the conflation of issues
whereby courts construct a meaning for the statutory “offer to sell”
term in the preliminary motion context in which such a determination is not warranted—opens the door to a solution. Because of the
binding Federal Circuit precedent created in 3D Systems and HollyAnne, which the district courts in adjudicating patent cases are obli196
gated to follow, there may be no other choice than to force a sub192

See BORN, supra note 32, at 69 (pointing out that in interpreting state long-arm
statutes “it is important to distinguish between statutory interpretation and constitutional analysis”).
193
See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204 (“Mechanical or quantitative evaluations of the defendant’s activities in the forum [cannot] resolve the question of reasonableness.”);
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (“[S]o far as those obligations
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires [a party] to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue.” (emphasis added)).
194
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
195
Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
196
See Wafios Mach. Corp. v. Nucoil Indus. Co., No. 03 Civ. 9865 (RWS), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13674, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2004) (“[W]hen analyzing personal jurisdiction for the purposes of compliance with federal due process, Federal Circuit law . . .
applies.” (quoting 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1377)); Moldflow Corp. v. Simcon, Inc., 296 F.
Supp. 2d 34, 39 (D. Mass. 2003) (“Because [plaintiff’s] underlying claim alleges patent
infringement, Federal Circuit law governs the adjudication of [defendant’s] motion to
dismiss [for lack of personal jurisdiction].”); Sitrick v. Freehand Sys., Inc., No. 02 C
1568, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21140, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2002) (“Federal Circuit
law . . . is controlling . . . in determining the question of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper.”); Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Dawson Int’l Inc., 216 F.
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stantive “offer to sell” determination into the analysis of a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and thus to draw Rotec into
197
the fray.
Such conflation practically obliterates the difference in result between a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction (supposedly not on
the merits) and a grant of summary judgment for the defendant (on
the merits), presenting the defendant with the opportunity to substantively defend the case without subjecting herself to the jurisdiction of
the court and officially mounting a defense. This regime significantly
impairs a plaintiff’s ability to effectively bring an “offer to sell” infringement suit by enabling a dismissal on the pleadings in a way that
eviscerates the merits of the case sufficiently to discourage trying again
in another forum into which the defendant could be haled into court.
Conversely, this regime greatly enhances the ability of a defendant—at
least one not subject to general jurisdiction in the forum—to escape
liability for offering to sell an infringing article by creating a no-lose
situation: a defendant moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction can assert substantive defenses as part of the motion; if the motion succeeds, the suit probably will not be brought again elsewhere,
and if the motion fails, the defendant can reap the benefits of the initial failure to construct an improved substantive defense.
C. A Possible Solution
In order to enable a more viable cause of action for “offer to sell”
infringement, the Federal Circuit may follow one of two paths. The
198
more radical path, that of abandoning the Akro test in favor of a
199
more conventional two-step personal jurisdiction determination,
Supp. 2d 754, 757 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (“Federal Circuit law controls the issue of whether
a non-resident Defendant accused of patent infringement is subject to personal jurisdiction.”); USA Payments Inc. v. Hotel Ramada of Nev., No. C-01-1450 VRW, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9493, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2001) (holding that since the question of
personal jurisdiction with regard to “an alleged out-of-state patent infringer is ‘intimately involved with the substance of the patent laws[,]’ the precedent of the Federal
Circuit” is determinative (quoting Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir.
1995))); Biometics L.L.C. v. New Womyn, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871 (E.D. Mo.
2000) (“When deciding an issue of personal jurisdiction in a patent case, a district
court must apply law of the Federal Circuit.”).
197
The second prong of the Akro three-prong test, as applied in Rotec, requires a
substantive analysis of whether the cause of action for the alleged “offer to sell” arises
out of or is related to the in-forum activities that constitute the alleged “offer to sell,” as
discussed in Part II.C.
198
Supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
199
See supra note 187 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction between
the two parts of a conventional personal jurisdiction inquiry).
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would not be palatable to a court still defining its role less than a quarter of a century after its creation. The more conservative path would
be to retain the Akro three-prong framework, but to construe the second prong more liberally as a test of whether the cause of action is
“reasonably related to” the activities within the forum.
Under this proposed test, the relationship between the activities,
the defendant, and the forum would return to being one of several
factors considered in assessing whether personal jurisdiction based on
200
in-forum contacts comports with due process, instead of the nearly
dispositive standard that the current second prong of Akro represents.
By using this proposed “reasonably related to” test, the Federal Circuit
could attain a conceptual separation between the procedural determination of whether personal jurisdiction is authorized and the substantive determination of the quality of activities captured within the
meaning of the statutory “offer to sell” language. Such conceptual
separation would bestow the benefit of predictability upon both patentees deciding whether and when to sue and alleged infringers
evaluating how to effectively respond to a suit. It would also improve
clarity and consistency in the resolution of “offer to sell” infringement
cases in the district and Federal Circuit courts.
As a supplement to a more conventional and less rigid personal
jurisdiction inquiry, a broader interpretation of “offer to sell” in §
271(a) would enhance the import of an “offer to sell” infringement
cause of action. Expanding the scope of “offer to sell” to include such
nascent sales activities as advertising, marketing, and soliciting would
201
better protect a patentee’s exclusive right.
Additionally, such an
expanded scope would be consistent with the interpretation of “on
sale” in § 102(b), recognizing that the two terms—“offer to sell” in §
271(a) and “on sale” in § 102(b)—serve complementary but not iden202
tical purposes in patent law.
Even absent a change in the application of the second prong of the Akro three-prong personal jurisdiction
inquiry, a more encompassing meaning of “offer to sell” would necessarily expand the range of activities that would satisfy the existing sec200

See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (“Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the
due process clause to insure.”); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (recognizing that “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation [is] . . .
the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction”).
201
See supra notes 100-05 (discussing the economic rationale underlying “offer to
sell” infringement).
202
See supra notes 106-21 (exploring the meaning of “on sale” as defined by Pfaff
and the analogy drawn between “on sale” and “offer to sell” in Rotec).
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203

ond prong, as currently applied, and would thus strengthen the ability of a patentee to pursue an “offer to sell” infringement action.
CONCLUSION
Because the prohibition on offering to sell a patented article has
204
been law in the United States for barely more than a decade, there
have been limited opportunities for the concomitant jurisprudence to
205
develop and become refined.
Nevertheless, the doctrine that has
emerged from “offer to sell” infringement litigation suffers from two
nearly disabling flaws. The primary problem is that the Federal Circuit’s three-prong Akro test for specific personal jurisdiction is unnecessarily restrictive in its second prong, requiring that a cause of action
arise out of or be (directly) related to the in-forum contacts of the de206
fendant. Application of the test in “offer to sell” cases has been even
207
more stringent than contemplated by Akro. As a result, courts applying this test have been drawn into making a substantive determination
of whether an “offer to sell” occurred within the meaning of § 271(a),
the patent infringement statute, in order to decide a preliminary procedural motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The secondary problem is that the Federal Circuit’s substantive
determination of the meaning of “offer to sell” under § 271(a) fails to
cover most of the widely ranging pre-sale activities that detract from
208
the economic value of a patentee’s grant of exclusivity.
By constru209
ing “offer to sell” to be equivalent to the “on sale” bar of § 102(b)
and the “offer” in traditional contract law, the ban on “offer to sell”
activities is reduced to serving as a tool that merely enables a patentee
203

See supra Part I.B for an analysis of the Federal Circuit’s application of the Akro
three-prong test in “offer to sell” infringement cases.
204
See supra note 2 (describing the 1994 modification of U.S. law that included the
addition of the “offer to sell” language to § 271(a)).
205
There have been no Supreme Court cases on “offer to sell” infringement and
only five such Federal Circuit cases: Fieldturf Int’l, Inc. v. Sprinturf, Inc., 433 F.3d
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006); MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp.,
420 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246
(Fed. Cir. 2000); HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999); and 3D
Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Lab., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
206
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
207
See supra notes 67, 79 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of stiffening the “related to” branch of the second prong in the Akro personal jurisdiction test).
208
See supra notes 96, 100-04 and accompanying text (arguing for a broader construction of the meaning of “offer”).
209
See supra Part II.B (discussing the definition of an offer under the “on sale”
bar).
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to bring suit at a slightly earlier time, and only in cases where an actual
210
infringing sale later occurs or is contemplated to occur.
For there to be a viable and enforceable cause of action for “offer
to sell” infringement, this Comment proposes that the Federal Circuit
211
should more liberally construe the second prong of Akro so that a
cause of action reasonably related to the defendant’s in-forum activities would suffice to convey personal jurisdiction, bounded by the requirements of due process. This critical conceptual separation between “offer to sell” activities adequate to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction and “offer to sell” activities satisfying the meaning of
the statutory term in § 271(a) would both stabilize the Akro test and
give the Federal Circuit more opportunities to flesh out the substan212
tive meaning of “offer to sell.”
Additionally, this Comment proposes that the Federal Circuit interpret “offer to sell” to include pre-sale activities such as advertising,
marketing, and soliciting that sufficiently describe the article offered
and the terms of the offer to cause the market for the patented article
to be negatively impacted, even if such pre-sale activities fall short of
the technical requirements of a potentially contractually binding of213
fer.
In sum, the addition of “offer to sell” language to the patent infringement statute, § 271(a), created an opportunity for the federal
courts to enhance protection of the exclusive rights granted to patentees in order to promote the advancement of science for the benefit
214
of all.
If the doctrine and statutory language are to fulfill that mandate, the Federal Circuit must first enunciate a clear standard by
which it will assert personal jurisdiction over defendants in “offer to
sell” patent infringement cases and must then set forth an interpretation of the term “offer to sell” which effectively protects the grant to
the patentee over the life of the patent.

210

See supra notes 96, 103 and accompanying text (criticizing the limitations imposed by the narrowest interpretation of the term “offer to sell”).
211
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (setting forth the second Akro prong).
212
If the district courts are permitted to take jurisdiction over more cases, presumably more will reach the CAFC on appeal.
213
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 3.3, at 112-13 (defining an offer under contract law).
214
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

